Appellate Division Reiterates the Standard for Sanctions for Frivolous Litigation
In the Matter of the Estate of Elise Morenon, No. A-0098-24, 2025 WL 3623723 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 15, 2025)
In 2013 Elise Morenon (“Testator”) retained an attorney (the “Attorney”) for estate planning. Testator identified her family, her assets and how she wanted those assets to be distributed. Testator told The Attorney she had never been married, did not have a spouse or partner, and had no children. Testator identified her family as her brother, Ernest, and his 2 children, Elizabeth and Will. The Attorney also certified that Testator advised The Attorney, “that she had this person named Anders Meyer…who lives with her in her apartment.” Id. at 2. When The Attorney asked Testator how to refer to Mr. Meyer in estate documents, i.e., as her boyfriend, her partner, her friend or something else, she said “just refer to him as Anders Meyer.” Id.
Testator owned 2 adjacent cooperative Apartments, #3C and #3D, in a Fort Lee building. Testator and Meyer occupied Apartment #3C as a residence and used Apartment #3D as an art studio and office.
Testator advised The Attorney that upon Testator’s death, she wanted to give Meyer to the right to live in Apartment #3C, provided that he pay the maintenance fees and real estate taxes on the unit during his occupancy. Testator did not want to give Meyer title to or a life estate in Apartment #3C and wanted his right to occupy the unit to terminate if Meyer failed to pay the fees and taxes on the unit or vacated the apartment for a continuous period of 6 or more months.
Testator wanted her brother to inherit Apartment #3D and to also receive Apartment #3C upon Meyer’s death or the loss of Meyer’s right of occupancy. Testator instructed The Attorney that Testator wanted her residuary estate held in trust for Meyer with the net income payable to him and discretion in the trustee as to principal distributions. Upon Meyer’s death, the trust remainder would be distributed to Testator’s niece and nephew.
Testator informed The Attorney that Testator wanted The Attorney to serve as executor and expressly rejected the suggestion that Meyer serve as executor. Testator instructed The Attorney to name Testator’s brother as trustee of the residuary trust and as successor executor in the event The Attorney could not serve.
The Attorney drafted a will reflecting Testator’s instructions and sent a draft to her in March, 2013. Testator requested changes. She no longer wanted Apartment #3C to be distributed to her brother after Meyer’s death or loss of right of occupancy, but, instead directed that upon the occurrence of either those events, Apartment #3C would be sold with the net sales proceeds added to the residuary trust. The Attorney sent Testator a revised draft of the will reflecting these changes in June 2013.
In January 2014, Testator mailed a marked-up copy of the draft to The Attorney with Testator’s handwritten edits. Testator and The Attorney later discussed the revisions on the phone. Testator stated she wanted to give Meyer the choice of living in either Apartment #3C, or Apartment #3D. She stated her concern that Meyer might not be able to afford the upkeep on Apartment #3C, and that the studio Apartment #3D might be a better option for him. The Attorney revised the draft will as instructed.
According to The Attorney, Testator never expressed the desire to bequeath either apartment to Meyer, nor did she state an intention to permit Meyer to occupy both apartments.
On February 10, 2014, Testator appeared in The Attorney’s office and signed the will, which was witnessed and notarized. Meyer conceded that he did not attend any meeting between Testator and The Attorney and further conceded that Testator never discussed the will or its terms with him. The first time Meyer saw the will was after Testator’s death.
Elise Morenon died April 19, 2023. Her will was admitted to probate and letters testamentary were issued to The Attorney.
On July 18, 2023, Meyer filed a verified complaint alleging that a conflict of interest disqualified The Attorney from serving as executor because she was scrivener of the will. In addition, Meyer alleged that Article Third of the Will was ambiguous and must be interpreted to bequeath title to both Apartment #3C and #3D to him. Meyers sought an order removing The Attorney as executor, appointing Meyer as administrator, and bequeathing title to both Apartments #3C and #3D to Meyer.
On October 6, 2023, the court denied Meyer’s request to remove The Attorney as executor.
The Attorney filed a counterclaim seeking instructions from the court interpreting Article Third of the will to give Meyer the option of living in either apartment, subject to the conditions in the will and without obtaining title or life estate in either. The Attorney also asked the court to set a deadline for Meyer to decide if he wants to occupy one of the apartments, and if so, identifying which one.
The Attorney moved for an order to enforce a June 27, 2024 order directing Meyer to give The Attorney mail addressed to Testator and to identify assets Meyer received from Testator outside the estate. After completing discovery, the parties cross moved for summary judgement. On August 23, 2024 the court issued an oral decision stating that there was no support for Meyer’s argument The Attorney could not serve as executor because she wrote the will and that there were no grounds on which to remove The Attorney as executor.
With respect to the meaning of Article Third of the will, regarding apartments, the court found that while Meyer was not “just making up” his argument that Testator intended to devise title to both apartments to him, “it comes pretty close to that.” Id. at 8. The court then went through the language of Article Third, which is not ambiguous. The trial court concluded, “…(neither apartment) was deeded over to him, and there is no explanation that you could possibly make that would say that…when you read that.”…It is clear on its face. There is no ambiguity whatsoever.” Id. at 9.
On August 26, 2024 the court entered an order: (1) denying Meyer’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing his complaint with prejudice (2) granting The Attorney’s cross-motion for summary judgment on her counterclaim, (3) interpreting Article Third of the will to give Meyer the option of residing in either Apartment #3C or #3D, subject to the conditions in the will, and (4) directing Meyer to submit a written election on which of the two apartments he wished to occupy within 20 days.
Also on August 26, 2024, the court adjourned The Attorney’s motion to enforce litigant’s rights and encouraged Meyer to comply with the June 27, 2024 order prior to the court’s consideration of that motion.
On September 11, 2024, Meyer filed a notice of appeal from the August 26, 2024 order. Meyer also moved in the trial court for a stay of the August 26, 2024 order pending appeal. The Attorney cross-moved for an award of attorney’s fees and costs and for sanctions against Meyer and his attorney pursuant to R. 1:4-8 The court denied Meyer’s request for a stay pending appeal. The court denied The Attorney’s motion for sanctions based on Meyer’s apparent belief in the validity of his arguments, despite the absence of legal support.
However, the court found that Meyer had deliberately failed to comply with the June 27, 2024 order. Thus, the court sanctioned Meyer $4,009.50, the amount of attorney’s fees and costs The Attorney incurred to move to enforce the order, and compelled Meyer to produce the mail and identify assets receive outside of the will.
The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court, finding that there was no basis for any of the arguments raised by Meyer. The Appellate Division began by noting that a trial court’s decision regarding the removal of a fiduciary is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Wolosoff v. CSI Liquidating Tr., 205 N.J. Super. 349, 360 (App. Div. 1985). The court also noted that a disagreement between the beneficiary and fiduciary is not cause for removal. In re Koretzky, 8 N.J. 506, 531 (1951)
The Appellate Division also found that Article Third of the Will was not ambiguous.
The Appellate Division, in its opinion presents a detailed discussion of the standards for an award of fees for frivolous litigation and concluded that the $4,000 sanction was appropriate.