Appellate Division Affirms Summary Decision that Joint Trust Became Irrevocable Upon Death of the First Spouse, and Subsequent Will by Decedent Does Not Trump Joint Trust Provisions or Deed Titling Real Estate in Joint Trust
In re Estate of Clements, Jr., Docket No. A-3235-23, 2026 WL 1296499 (N.J. Super. App. Div. May 12, 2026)
This case addresses the impact of real estate remaining titled in the name of a trust, despite allegations that the decedent intended otherwise.
Susanne Snock (“Snock”) — one of the two daughters of the decedent — filed a Verified Complaint against Nancy Clements (“Nancy”), the decedent’s second wife, regarding the assets and a related trust of the decedent.
In 1987, the decedent and his first wife created the Clements Revocable Living Trust (“Trust”). In October 2003, the decedent and his first wife transferred a residence in Ocean City, New Jersey (“Ocean City House”) into the Trust. A deed memorializing the transfer into the Trust was recorded with the Cape May County Clerk. In 2004, the executed an amended and restated version of the Trust.
The decedent’s first wife died in 2006. Snock asserted that, because of that death, the Trust could not be amended or revoked, especially as to the first wife’s interests.
The decedent then died in 2021. Approximately ten days before his death, the decedent executed a new will providing that the residue of his estate was to pass to Nancy. Nancy claimed that this will and other information confirmed that, despite the Trust, the deed, etc., the Ocean City House passed under the will to her.
Snock became the trustee of the Trust after her father’s death. She and her sister were the named beneficiaries of the Trust. Snock sought to enforce the terms of the Trust and have title to the Ocean City House confirmed to be in the Trust, with Nancy having no interest in the Trust or the Ocean City House.
On the return date of the Order to Show Cause issued on the Complaint, the trial judge recited the standard governing summary actions under R. 4:67-5. The court granted the summary action, finding that the Trust and the deed made this case ripe for summary disposition. Those documents expressed the decedent’s intent in plain language. The court stressed that the deed was recorded with the Cape May County Clerk and was still a matter of public record. In addition, the trial judge found that the decedent never exercised the power to revoke or amend the Trust according to the terms of the Trust. The court likewise rejected Nancy’s argument that the last will and correspondence among the decedent and others operated as a revocation.
Nancy moved for reconsideration. The trial court denied that motion.
Nancy appealed. Among other arguments, she asserted that the trial court should have allowed more time for discovery, including depositions of the attorney and accountant who allegedly would confirm the decedent’s intent.
The Appellate Division affirmed. It explained that a trial court is permitted to proceed in a summary manner when allowed by rule or by statute, and such a procedure was permitted here. The court is permitted to resolve the matter on the return date if the pleadings and affidavits show palpably that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. R. 4:67; N.J.S.A. 3B:2-4; R. 4:83-1 (“Unless otherwise specified, all actions in the Superior Court, Chancery Division, Probate Part, shall be brought in a summary manner . . . .”).
The Appellate Division explained that a summary action is not a summary judgment motion. Courier News v. Hunterdon Cnty. Prosecutor’s Off., 358 N.J. Super. 373, 378 (App. Div. 2003). In a summary proceeding, the party opposing judgment “is not entitled to favorable inferences such as those afforded to the respondent in a summary judgment motion.” Id. at 379.
The appeals court also surveyed the standards on appellate review, probable intent and reconsideration.
The Appellate Division reviewed the structure of the Trust. It then applied that structure to the facts of the case. The appeals court agreed with the trial judge that: the power to revoke the Trust as to the decedent’s first wife ended with her passing; the decedent’s letter to the attorney was insufficient to amount to a revocation of the Trust; no evidence existed that the decedent ever effectuated the revocation of the Trust; and the Ocean City House remained titled in the name of the Trust in the public record.