New Jersey Supreme Court Addresses Standards for Legal Malpractice Actions Against Estate Planners
Christakos v. Boyadjis, 262 N.J. 477 (2026)
The New Jersey Supreme Court addressed when an attorney owes a duty of care to a non-client, such that that non-client can pursue a legal malpractice case. The Court held that a drafting attorney of a will owes no duty of care to a non-client, unless there is clear and convincing evidence that there is a duty to the non-client under unique circumstances. In reaching this conclusion, the Court adopted the standards of Section 51 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers.
The decedents were brothers Peter and Nicholas (Nick) Christakos. They had never married or had children. They lived together in their childhood home. They had eight siblings.
In 2003, Peter and Nick executed parallel wills which provided that, upon one brother’s death, his estate would pass to the other brother. If the other brother had died, the estate would be divided equally between two of their then-living brothers, Constantine and James, per stirpes.
The potential bequest to their brother, James, was tied to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were Helen Christakos and her mother, Despina (Alice) Christakos. Helen was the only child of James. Helen’s mother, Alice, was James’s wife. Since James was named as an alternate beneficiary under the 2003 wills, and since James had passed away in the interim, Helen and Alice claimed an interest in the estates. In actuality, under the 2003 wills, Helen would receive James’s 50% share of the estates.
Helen, a lawyer in California, testified at her deposition that she saw Peter and Nick once or twice a year and spoke with them several times a month. During a conversation in July 2017, Peter, who was then 86 years old, shared with her his concerns about his failing health, and what would happen to Nick, who was then 95 years old, if Peter died before Nick. At the time, Helen stood to inherit under the 2003 will as James’s daughter, but she did not know that. Helen’s mother, Alice, who moved to California in 2014, also knew nothing about the 2003 will.
On July 17, 2017, Helen sent an email to an acquaintance, defendant Anthony Boyadjis, Esquire (“Attorney”). She asked him to contact Peter and Nick to address the fact that Peter was concerned about getting his affairs in order.
The Attorney met with Peter and Nick in July 2017. The attorney erroneously advised Peter that, under the 2003 will, if one brother pre-deceased the other, the children of all their eight siblings would inherit; in reality, since both Constantine and James – the brothers named in the 2003 wills as alternate beneficiaries — had already passed, their shares would have passed to their children. Each had left one child, including Helen as the daughter of James.
In short, the Attorney misread the 2003 wills and did not realize the mistake until after both decedents had passed. If the 2003 wills had remained in place, Helen would have been a 50% beneficiary of the entire estates.
Peter asked the Attorney to prepare new wills for Peter and Nick to leave everything to each other, but Peter was uncertain about the alternate bequest of the residue. Peter later advised the Attorney that he might want to leave some of his estate to neighbors, a church, Alice, and Helen. However, Peter was not certain.
Both Peter and Nick were hospitalized in 2018. The Attorney received an urgent call from Peter. According to the Attorney, Peter instructed him to prepare new wills so that the alternative residuary bequest would pass equally among the neighbors, the church, and Alice.
The Attorney brought the wills to the hospital. Peter executed his will on January 3, 2018. The Attorney testified that Nick did not have testamentary capacity at that time but by April 2018 Nick did have capacity; Nick executed his will at that point. Therefore, both brothers revised their wills in 2018.
However, the Attorney admitted a second error: both of the 2018 wills conveyed only the personal property to the surviving brother, and not the entire estate. Instead, the 2018 wills provided for the remainder of the estate to pass to the neighbors, the church, and Alice. Helen was not included.
Meanwhile, in March and April of 2018, two physicians concluded that Nick was unable to handle his affairs and needed a guardian. This arose when the county Board of Social Services was engaged due to concerns that Peter could no longer care safely for Nick.
Peter died in April 2018. Nick died in October 2018. Litigation occurred regarding both estates and was settled: the 2018 wills were admitted to probate; the church and the neighbor each agreed to accept $100,000; and the remainer of the estates was awarded to Alice. Alice also became the administrator of the estates. The assets were estimated at values from $915,000 to over $1 million.
Alice and Helen then sued the Attorney for malpractice, alleging that he breached a duty of care he owed to them. They alleged that the Attorney misinterpreted the 2003 wills, causing Peter to request revised wills; incorrectly left Peter’s estate to Alice, the neighbor, and the church, rather than to Nick; omitted Helen as a beneficiary in the 2018 wills; and arranged for Nick to execute the 2018 will when Nick lacked capacity.
Alice sought among other damages from the Attorney the funds paid to the neighbors and the church as well as $575,000 in legal fees.
The Attorney moved for summary judgment, arguing among other points that he did not owe a duty to Alice and Helen. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the Attorney owed a duty of care to them because they were known beneficiaries of the estates and he was reasonably aware that his legal services would impact them.
The Appellate Division granted the Attorney’s motion for an interlocutory appeal. It affirmed the trial court’s decision in part and reversed in part, centering on whether the Attorney owed a duty to Helen and Alice.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification and leave for the New Jersey State Bar Association to appear as amicus curiae.
The Supreme Court explained that the existence of a duty of care is generally a question of law. To sustain a legal malpractice claim, a plaintiff must prove: an attorney-client relationship creating a duty of care by the defendant attorney; breach of that duty; and proximate causation of the damages claimed by the plaintiff.
The Court acknowledged that it had not always clearly articulated the test for when an attorney owes a duty of care to a non-client, such that that non-client can sue for malpractice. However, the Court noted a duty of care to non-clients arises only in limited circumstances.
The Supreme Court then expressly adopted Section 51 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers as the test to determine when an attorney owes a duty of care to a non-client. Under subsection (2) of Section 51 of the Restatement, a lawyer owes a duty of care “to a nonclient when and to the extent that: (a) the lawyer or (with the lawyer’s acquiescence) the lawyer’s client invites the nonclient to rely on the lawyer’s opinion or provision of other legal services, and the nonclient so relies; and (b) the nonclient is not, under-applicable tort law, too remote from the lawyer to be entitled to protection.”
In addition, under subsection (3) of Section 51 of the Restatement, a lawyer owes a duty of care “to a nonclient when and to the extent that: (a) the lawyer knows that a client intends as one of the primary objectives of the representation that the lawyer’s services benefit the nonclient; (b) such duty would not significantly impair the lawyer’s performance of obligations to the client; and (c) the absence of such a duty would make enforcement of those obligations to the client unlikely.”
The Court specifically cited Comment f. to Section 51, which provides “[w]hen a lawyer knows…that a client intends a lawyer’s services to benefit a third person who is not a client, allowing the nonclient to recover from the lawyer for negligence in performing those services may promote the lawyer’s loyal and effective pursuit of the client’s objectives,” especially where “the client has died” and the non-client may therefore “ be the only person likely to enforce the lawyer’s duty to the client.” Nevertheless, the Court observed, Comment f. cautions that “[a] nonclient’s claim under subsection (3) is recognized only when doing so will both implement the client’s intent and serve to fulfill the lawyer’s obligations to the client.” Finally, Comment f. warns that “[w]ithout adequate evidence” of the client’s intent, “upholding a third person’s claim could expose lawyers to liability for following a client’s instructions in circumstances where it would be difficult to prove what those instructions had been. Threat of such liability would tend to discourage lawyers from following client instructions….”
The Court also cited two pertinent examples under Comment f. as to estates.
The Court thus concluded that to sustain a claim by a non-client that an attorney failed to exercise the required duty of care, the non-client must present clear and convincing evidence the will was not properly prepared and meet the standards of Section 51 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers.
Applying these standards to the case before it, the Supreme Court found that the Attorney did not owe a duty of care to Helen. For example, the Court found no genuine dispute regarding Helen’s lack of reliance on the Attorney’s legal opinion. Also, she was neither invited to rely, nor did rely, on that opinion. In addition, no reasonable jury could find that the Attorney knew that Nick and Peter intended their 2018 wills to benefit Helen. In addition, the decedents’ intent to benefit Helen did not appear on the face of the 2018 wills. As a result, Helen could not establish a duty from the Attorney to her by producing clear and convincing evidence that the decedents communicated to the Attorney their intent that Helen be a beneficiary under the 2018 wills.
The Court also rejected Helen’s contention that Nick’s 2018 will should never have been executed since he lacked testamentary capacity. The recognition of such a duty could conflict with a lawyer’s vigorous representation of the actual client.